
Democracy and Development: The Nigeria Experience (1989-2008)

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Abstract

This study examined primarily the relationship or linkage between democracy and development, with particular reference to the Nigerian experience. In the analysis, the study took into consideration some economic and non-economic variables which encapsulates our working definition of development, and analyse same distinctively under military and democratic regimes. The variables considered included, GDP growth rate, GDP per capita, Unemployment Rate, Poverty Incidence, Corruption Perception Index and Human Development Index. The study used percentages, tables and graphs for the analysis of these variables on a 10 year intervals under democracy and military regimes. Our study reveals that there were improvements in the economic fortunes of Nigeria in terms of economic growth (GDP improvements) under democratic regime. However, these improvements in national income was achieved alongside rising rate of unemployment and poverty incidence, while Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and Human Development Index (HDI) were indifferent. These evidences do not empirically support the hypothesis that development is better served or attained under democracy, hence, the study concluded that democracy does not in absolute terms cause development in Nigeria. Although, economic growth being a significant component of development is better served under democracy, such growth is not transmitted into improvements in human welfare such as more jobs, poverty reduction and all other indices which encapsulates human development in Nigeria. The study recommends systematic and sustained investment in human capital, genuine affront on systemic corruption and a review of elitism in Nigeria's political system and processes.

Key Words: *Development, human development index, economic growth, corruption, poverty and democracy.*

1.0 Introduction

Nigeria has become an intransigent problem to development scholars. How a nation of abundant human and material resources remain in an underdeveloped state after fifty seven years of independent has become a puzzle to be solved. Nigeria is the most populous African country having a population of over 190 million with more than half of the population below 30 years of age (Nigeria Population Commission 2017). In addition to large population made up of mostly young people, Nigeria is also the highest oil producing country in Africa and 13th in the world. As a result, the Nation has over the years earned enormous revenue from oil

exportation. According to Fukuyama (2015), Nigeria has earned over \$400 billion in oil revenue from the 1970s to 2000.

In addition to large population and huge oil production, Nigeria also have a vast agricultural land and resources. It covers a land mass of 923,769 sq. km. consisting of varied geographical features. The dry and savannah areas of the north suits production of sorghum, groundnuts, maize, millets, cotton, cow rearing etc. While the tropical rain forest of the South is adept for the production of yam, cassava, cocoa, rubber, oil palm etc. The coastal wetlands of the Niger delta has an abundant sea foods and aquatic lives. Consequently, the country produces varieties of agricultural products based on its multi geographical conditions. According to National Bureau of Statistics (NBS 2010) out of Nigeria total labour force of seventy three million, sixty million are rural dwellers among whom 70% are engaged in agriculture and food production. This makes agricultural sector the highest employer of labour in Nigeria. Specifically, the agricultural sector employs approximately 31% of Nigeria's total labour force. Ironically, the despite employing about one-third of the total labour force, the agricultural sector contributes only about 17.8% to the Nigeria's GDP, while sectors like services and industry contributes 54.6% and 25.7% respectively (CBN, Various).

It is not surprising, therefore, that after rebasing of the economy in 2014, Nigeria became the largest economy in Africa. However in a classic case of GDP as an inadequate tool for measuring economic development (Piketty, 2015); being the largest economy in the continent doesn't seem to make living conditions in Nigeria any better. Hence the country remains a development quagmire for practitioners.

Politically, the story of Nigeria is also not a smooth one. The country is a former British colony that got independence in 1960 under a Westminster Parliamentary Constitution. In 1966, the Military overthrew the elected government and from thence the country passed through three decades of military rule with a brief interlude of civil rule from 1979 to 1983. Democracy was restored in Nigeria in 1999 and the country is fast becoming one of the stable democratic states in Africa having undergone four democratic government transitions in 19 years.

The objective of this study is to primary investigate if there is any linkage and/or relationship between democratic or civil rule and development. There has been an unresolved controversy as to whether development is better served or attained under democratic government or not. This present study contributes to the debate on the linkage between democracy and development using Nigeria as a case study. We did a comparative analysis of vital economic/social data from the last ten years of military rule and the first ten years of democratic governance in Nigeria. The aim is to see if there is any significant positive change in the trend that will give credence to the view that democracy aids development.

2.0 Review of Literature

2.1 Conceptual Framework

The working definition for democracy in this work is as postulated by Fukuyama (2006). Democracy represents the right held by citizens to have a share of political power in the state; "a country is democratic if it grants its people the right to choose their own government through periodic, secret ballot, multi-party elections on the basis of universal and equal adult suffrage"(pp.43).

Development on the other hand like most social science concepts is multi-definitional and more contentious. Our use of the concept "Development" in this work is guided by Seers (1969) and Goulet (1971). For Seers, as cited in Nwaeze (2017), three critical questions to be asked about development are: the trends of poverty, unemployment and income inequality. If these three

have shown tremendous improvements, such can be called development. However, if one or worst still, three of them have worsened over time, it will be unreasonable to call such development, even when per capita income has doubled. He nevertheless acknowledged that there are other non-economic factors that are inclusive in development but he categorized them as secondary factors while economic factors take primacy.

According to Goulet (1971) for the concept “Development” to be meaningful, it must incorporate three basic core values: - life sustenance, self-esteem and freedom. Life sustenance is about the provision of basic/primary needs, self-esteem stands for the feeling of self-respect and independent while freedom is concerned with the ability of people to choose their way of life. While life sustenance is akin to the three factors of poverty and unemployment and inequality in Seers, self-esteem and freedom constitute those non-economic factors that Seers acknowledged but refer to as secondary. In attempt to cover both economic and non-economic areas of development we concentrated on gross domestic product(GDP), unemployment rate, poverty rate, human development index(HDI) and corruption perception index(CPI).

2.2 Democracy and Development

Ever since the publication in 1959 of Lipset’s essay “Some Social Requisites of Democracy”, development scholars have been engrossed in trying to understand the complex relationship between Democracy and Development. Is there any link between them? If there is, what is the nature, is it a causal link or a mere correlation? If it is causal what is the direction of the causation, which one is the cause and which is the effect?

However scholars usually ignore the role definitions play in this debate. Whether or not linkage exists between these two concepts will to some extent be determined by one’s definition of Development. If and when development is defined in line with Goulet (1971), Sen (1999) and Ake (1996), it intrinsically becomes an element of democracy. This is because for these scholars development includes not only factors that enhance material wellbeing (economic factors) but also other normative values. For Goulet it includes entrenchment and preservation of freedom and self-esteem among the populace. For Sen and Ake individual freedom and right to self-determination is a fundamental element of development. From these perspectives it is superficial to ask if democracy is prerequisite to development. The answer is obvious.

However if development is seen from the point of view of Seers(1969) which considers the non-economic factors as secondary while giving primacy to poverty profile, unemployment rate and income inequality in the state, then the question becomes necessary on whether democracy enhances development or vice versa. Most positions on the debate stem from this perspective, and the question mostly has been, does democracy necessarily lead to growth in GDP, reduction in poverty, unemployment and inequality or is it the other way round.

With the publication in 1989 of World Banks’ “Sub Saharan Africa-from Crises to Sustainable Growth” it became an official and orthodox position of most development agencies and scholars that good governance which is a corollary to liberal democracy is a necessary condition for socio-economic development. By the 1990s the idea that democratization leads to economic growth and development had become an analytical perspective in social sciences, a common term among developmental institutions and professionals and central to donor conditionality. This idea points out that the state has a new role to play in creating the right environment for economic growth. It holds that economic growth and socio-economic development depend on some normative factors. These factors are a set of indicators that encompass a range of values and desirable social objectives (Wagener, 2011).Core to those

values are political representation, rule of law and accountability which are all essential features of liberal democracy. It stresses a positive relationship between political democratization/economic liberalization and economic growth and development.

This claim was validated in Zhuang, Emmanuel de dois, & Lag- Martin, (2010). In their work they are able to trace a direct positive causality between rule of law, political representation and accountability (democratization) and economic development. The developing Asia economies with above average score in these areas were found to be growing faster than those with below average score. Also Han, Khan & Zhuang (2014) submitted that democratization is associated with both a higher level of per capita GDP as well as higher rates of GDP growth over time and therefore improves country's economic prospect. In Brazil, Goncalves (2013) demonstrated how participatory democracy led to improved health care delivery. Gerring, Bond, Brandt & Moreno (2005) in their historical study on democracy and economic growth concludes that democracy leads to a stronger economic performance in the long run. These studies therefore seem to be suggesting that any nation desirous of economic growth and development has to embrace liberal democracy. In other words, democracy is a prerequisite for development.

Mustaq Khan has been a consistent critic of the postulation that democracy precedes and breeds economic development. In Khan, (2004) and Gray & Khan, (2010) he argued that the theory was based on wrong reading of history. He claims that there is no historical evidence that indicates that liberal democracy is a pre-condition for economic growth and development. Rather as shown in Burkhart & Beck (1994), rise in per capita income precedes the emergence of democracy and not the other way round. His submission therefore is that rather than being a pre-condition for economic growth, evidence from history shows that democracy is typically an outcome of successful economic development. This view is collaborated by Kurtz & Schrank (2007) who noted that there are number of developing countries who are doing badly democratically based on the World Governance Index bench mark but are recording good economic growth. A somewhat similar view was presented in Sachs, MacArthur, Schmidt-Traub, Kruk, Bahadur, Faye & McCord (2004), who argued that policy reform (democratization) will not be sufficient to ensure economic growth and development in a poverty trapped African countries.

Fukuyama (2006) affirms that there exists a very strong correlation between those two variables. For him the existence of an empirical connection between the two is undeniable. However he noted that the exact nature of the relationship is complex and may be unknowable as there seems to be no "necessary connection" between them. The only thing that can be observed in history is that economic development sometimes proceeds and sometimes follow democracy. For Menocal (2007) the evidence linking democracy to development is inconclusive.

Based on the above, we investigated the Nigeria experience of democracy and development. We did a comparative analysis of twenty years (1989-2008) data. Last ten years of pre democracy era and first ten years of democracy era. We covered both economic and non-economic facets of development. Unemployment, GDP and poverty rate represent the economic while human development index (HDI) and corruption perception index (CPI) represent the non-economic factors. The objective is to generate evidence that will contribute in either validating or nullifying the postulation that democracy is a prerequisite to development.

3.0 Methodology

The study utilised percentages, tables and graphs to analyse the data on GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, poverty incidence, human development index and corruption perception index, sourced from the Central Bank of Nigeria, Transparency International and World Banks' World Development Indicators, between 1989 and 2008, embodying 10 years of military rule and 10 years of democratic rule in Nigeria.

3.1 Data Presentation and Analysis:

Table 1: Unemployment Rate in Nigeria 1989-2008

Year	Rate (%)
1989	4
1990	5.5
1991	5.7
1992	7.5
1993	7.2
1994	2.0
1995	1.8
1996	3.4
1997	3.2
1998	3.2
Average (Military Rule)	2.1
1999	3.0
2000	18.1
2001	13.6
2002	12.3
2003	14.8
2004	13.4
2005	11.9
2006	12.3
2007	12.7
2008	14.9
Average (Civil Rule)	12.7


Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin, 2010; CBN Annual Reports, 2012.

Table 1b: Decomposition of Unemployment Rate in Nigeria

MILITARY RULE			DEMOCRACY RULE		
	PERIOD	RATE (%)		PERIOD	RATE (%)
YEAR 1	1989	4	YEAR 1	1999	3.0
YEAR 2	1990	5.5	YEAR 2	2000	18.1
YEAR 3	1991	5.7	YEAR 3	2001	13.6
YEAR 4	1992	7.5	YEAR 4	2002	12.3
YEAR 5	1993	7.2	YEAR 5	2003	14.8
YEAR 6	1994	2.0	YEAR 6	2004	13.4
YEAR 7	1995	1.8	YEAR 7	2005	11.9
YEAR 8	1996	3.4	YEAR 8	2006	12.3
YEAR 9	1997	3.2	YEAR 9	2007	12.7
YEAR 10	1998	3.2	YEAR 10	2008	14.9
AVERAGE		2.1			12.7

Source: author's computation with data from table 1

Figure 1: Pictorial Analysis Showing 10 Years Unemployment Rate Comparison between Military Rule and Civil Rule



Source: author's computation with data on table 1b

Evidence from table 1b and figure 1 above shows that unemployment rate was exacerbated during the civil rule than military rule, in our ten (10) year comparative analysis. On the

average, whereas unemployment rate during military rule was 2.7%, it worsened to a staggering average rate of 12.7%. This represents approximately 504% increase in unemployment rate between the last 10 years military rule and the first 10 years civil rule. On this evidence, therefore, it is logical to conclude that keeping every other factors constant, the Nigerian economy was better-off in terms of unemployment during the military regime than the democratic dispensation.

Table 2. Gross Domestic Product Per Capita

Year	Amount (N)
1989	187,298.50
1990	205,824.70
1991	199,405.90
1992	195,279.50
1993	194,427.80
1994	191,358.20
1995	186,069.00
1996	190,545.70
1997	191,055.20
1998	191,397.70
Average (Military)	193,266.22
1999	187,546.10
2000	192,616.40
2001	196,104.40
2002	198,437.80
2003	213,475.70
2004	278,249.00
2005	280,457.10
2006	295,636.10
2007	307,593.60
2008	318,307.70
Average (Civil Rule)	246,842.39


Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin (Various Issues) and World Development Indicator

Table 2b: Decomposition of Gross Domestic Product Per Capita in Nigeria

MILITARY RULE			DEMOCRACY RULE		
	PERIOD	GDP PCI (N)		PERIOD	GDP PCI (N)
YEAR 1	1989	187,298.50		YEAR 1	187,546.10
YEAR 2	1990	205,824.70		YEAR 2	192,616.40
YEAR 3	1991	199,405.90		YEAR 3	196,104.40
YEAR 4	1992	195,279.50		YEAR 4	198,437.80
YEAR 5	1993	194,427.80		YEAR 5	213,475.70
YEAR 6	1994	191,358.20		YEAR 6	278,249.00
YEAR 7	1995	186,069.00		YEAR 7	280,457.10
YEAR 8	1996	190,545.70		YEAR 8	295,636.10
YEAR 9	1997	191,055.20		YEAR 9	307,593.60
YEAR 10	1998	191,397.70		YEAR 10	318,307.70
AVERAGE		193,266.22		AVERAGE	246,842.39

Source: author's analysis with data from table 2

Figure 2. GDP Per Capita Income in Nigeria: 1989-1998 (military) & 1999-2008 (civil rule)



Source: author's computation with data on table 2B

Table 3. Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate

Year	Growth Rate (%)
1989	7.7
1990	13
1991	-0.8
1992	2.3
1993	1.3
1994	0.2
1995	2.2
1996	4.4

1997	2.8
1998	2.9
Average (Military)	3.6
1999	0.4
2000	5.2
2001	8.4
2002	11.3
2003	10.2
2004	10.5
2005	6.5
2006	6.0
2007	6.5
2008	6.0
Average (Civil Rule)	7.1


Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin (Various Issues)

Table 3b: Decomposition of Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate in Nigeria

MILITARY RULE			DEMOCRACY RULE			
	PERIOD	GDP GROWTH (%)		PERIOD	GDP GROWTH (%)	
YEAR 1	1989	7.7		YEAR 1	1999	0.4
YEAR 2	1990	13		YEAR 2	2000	5.2
YEAR 3	1991	-0.8		YEAR 3	2001	8.4
YEAR 4	1992	2.3		YEAR 4	2002	11.3
YEAR 5	1993	1.3		YEAR 5	2003	10.2
YEAR 6	1994	0.2		YEAR 6	2004	10.5
YEAR 7	1995	2.2		YEAR 7	2005	6.5
YEAR 8	1996	4.4		YEAR 8	2006	6.0
YEAR 9	1997	2.8		YEAR 9	2007	6.5
YEAR 10	1998	2.9		YEAR 10	2008	6.0
AVERAGE		3.6		AVERAGE		7.1

Source: author's analysis with data from table 3

Figure 3. GDP Growth Rate in Nigeria: 1989-1998 (military) & 1999-2008 (civil rule)



Source: author's computation with data on table 3B

Evidences from tables 2b and 3b and figures 2 and 3 show that Nigeria has fared better in terms of economic growth indicators during democratic regime than in military regime. GDP per capita income increased by 27% with an average of N246, 842.39 in the democratic dispensation from an average of N193, 266.22 during military rule. Likewise, in terms of growth rate in GDP, the rate increased by 97% during the first 10 years of democracy, with an average growth rate of 7.1% compare to an average growth rate of 3.6% during the last 10 years of military rule. As such, it is logical to conclude that keeping other factors constant, the Nigerian economy have witnessed improved economic growth during democratic rule than military rule in the ten year periods under review.

Table 4. Nigeria's Corruption Perception Index 1996-2008

Year	Score	Position	Number of countries rated
1996	0.69	54	54
1997	1.76	52	52
1998	1.9	81	85
Average (Military)	1.45	62	64
1999	1.6	98	99
2000	1.2	90	90
2001	1.0	90	91
2002	1.6	101	102
2003	1.4	132	133
2004	1.6	144	145
2005	1.9	152	158
2006	2.2	142	163
2007	2.2	147	179
2008	2.7	121	180
Average (Civil Rule)	1.48	122	134

Source: Transparency International

*** CPI ranking started in 1995 and Nigeria was not ranked in the first annual ranking.

From table 4 above, the analysis of Nigeria's corruption perception index is indifferent. Thus, there has not been any improvement or deterioration on the average score and positional ranking of Nigeria in both military and democratic dispensations. Whereas CPI averaged 1.45% during military rule, the CPI averaged 1.48% during democratic dispensation. Although, there is a marginal increase of 0.003%, it is not significant statistically to conclude that CPI has improved or deteriorated within these periods. Keeping all other factors constant, therefore, it is logically we conclude that CPI in Nigeria has remained indifferent in both regimes.

Table 5. Poverty Rate in Nigeria 1989-2008

Year	Poverty Incidence (%)
1989	52.4
1990	54.9
1991	55.1
1992	57.1
1993	58.4
1994	45.9
1995	50.8
1996	65.6
1997	64.9
1998	66.8
Average (Military)	57.2
1999	63.5
2000	74
2001	83.1
2002	88
2003	54
2004	53.4
2005	54.2
2006	55
2007	53
2008	53
Average(Civil Rule)	63.1


Source: NBS, Harmonized Nigeria Living Standard Survey, 2010; CBN Statistical Bulletin, 2008 & CBN Annual Reports (2000-2008); and World Development Indicator-from www.data.worldbank/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY?locations=NG

Table 5b. Decomposition of Poverty Incidence in Nigeria

MILITARY RULE			DEMOCARCY RULE		
	PERIOD	PI (%)		PERIOD	PI (%)
YEAR 1	1989	52.4	YEAR 1	1999	63.5
YEAR 2	1990	54.9	YEAR 2	2000	74
YEAR 3	1991	55.1	YEAR 3	2001	83.1
YEAR 4	1992	57.1	YEAR 4	2002	88
YEAR 5	1993	58.4	YEAR 5	2003	54
YEAR 6	1994	45.9	YEAR 6	2004	53.4
YEAR 7	1995	50.8	YEAR 7	2005	54.2
YEAR 8	1996	65.6	YEAR 8	2006	55
YEAR 9	1997	64.9	YEAR 9	2007	53
YEAR 10	1998	66.8	YEAR 10	2008	53
AVERAGE		57.2	AVERAGE		63.1

Source: author’s analysis with data from table 5

Figure 4. Nigeria Poverty Incidence: 1989-1998 (military) & 1999-2008 (civil rule)



Source: author’s computation with data on table 5

The analysis as represented by table 5 and figure 4 indicates that Nigerians have fared better in terms of poverty incidence during military rule than during democracy. On the average, the poverty incidence during military rule was 57.2%, while it was 63.1% during democratic rule. In essence, Nigerians are approximately 10% poorer during the first 10 years of democracy when compared to the last 10 years of military rule. It is, therefore, logical to conclude that Nigerians have become worse off in terms of poverty incidence during democratic dispensation.

Table 6. Human Development Index (HDI)

Year	Value	Rating
1985-1990	0.411	Low HDI
1991-1995	0.432	Low HDI
1996-2000	0.445	Low HDI
2001-2005	0.470	Low HDI

Source: UNDP Human Development Index-from hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI

The Human Development Index is composite index which includes health, education, income, livelihood security and other indicators. The aim of the HDI is that people are the real value of any development or nation, hence, the richness of human lives is what every nation's government should be concern about. It, follows, therefore, that the higher the HDI, the better the conditions the country have created for its citizens to live and work.

Nigeria's ranking on HDI shows that the country has not improve the people during military and democratic regimes. Since the inception of the HDI ranking, Nigeria has remained in low HDI ranking, hence, signifying indifference in either regimes. What this implies is that human development in Nigeria, measured in terms of healthcare, education, income, livelihood security and the general wellbeing of citizens have remained unchanged in both dispensations.

3.2 Summary and Discussions:

The available data indicates the following, GDP per capita income in Nigeria increased by 27% in the first 10 years of democratic rule over the last ten years of military regime. GDP growth rate also increased under democratic dispensation. In the last ten years of military regime the average GDP growth rate was 3.6% but under the first ten years of democratic rule the average growth rate was 7.1%, an increase rate of about 97%.The growth in GDP however neither impacted on unemployment rate nor in poverty rate. Rather while GDP was increasing, unemployment and poverty was also increasing at a faster rate. There was a 504% increase in unemployment rate from the last ten years of military rule to the first ten years of democracy. The average unemployment rate under the military was 2.7% but 12.7% under democratic rule. Poverty rate also increased under democracy by about 10% from 57.2% average poverty incidence to 63%. Corruption perception index (CPI) and Human development index (HDI) were indifferent and stagnant.

The above represents a classic case of economic growth without corresponding improvement on development. It is apparent that democratization in Nigeria led to increase in both GDP per capita income and GDP growth rate but this happened in the mist of growing poverty, worsening unemployment, general human wellbeing and deprivations. This situation (economic growth without development) has long been recognised by scholars (Clower, Dalton, Harwitz, & Walters 1966; Easterly, 2001; Breslin 2003). This scenario is what Myrdal (1968; cited by Nwaeze, 2017) dubbed "The Asian Drama"- capturing a period of mesmerising economic growth performance of South-East Asian countries amidst persistent and rising poverty. It, therefore, follows that, if development is synonymous or equated with growth in GDP (economic growth), it would be valid to postulate that democracy led to development in Nigeria. However, whereas economic growth is a necessary condition for development, it is not sufficient to be taken as synonymous with development. There is contemporary consensus as to the inadequacy of growth being equated with development, as many scholars have since found that position erroneous (Ranis, Stewart & Ramirez, 2000, Subbotina 2004, Piketty 2015). Rather than being an objective, economic growth is a means while the goal is human

development. Nigeria unfortunately is stuck in the means without realizing the objective. For its size of GDP Nigeria has performed poorly in all aspect of human development and that is why it has remained a development enigma.

3.3 Conclusion

This study examined primarily the relationship or linkage between democracy and development, with particular reference to the Nigerian experience. In the analysis, the study took into consideration some economic and non-economic variables which encapsulates our working definition of development, and analyse same distinctively under military and democratic regimes. The variables considered included, GDP growth rate, GDP per capita, Unemployment Rate, Poverty Incidence, Corruption Perception Index and Human Development Index.

Our study reveals that there were improvements in the economic fortunes of Nigeria in terms of economic growth (GDP improvements) under democratic regime. However, these improvements in national income was achieved alongside rising rate of unemployment and poverty incidence, while Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and Human Development Index (HDI) were indifferent. These evidences do not empirically support the hypothesis that development is better served or attained under democracy, hence, we conclude that democracy does not in absolute terms cause development in Nigeria. Although, economic growth being a significant component of development is better served under democracy, such growth is not transmitted into improvements in human welfare such as more jobs, poverty reduction and all other indices which encapsulates human development in Nigeria.

A lot of theories have been put forward in an attempt to explain factors behind the phenomenon of economic growth without development. Relevant to Nigeria situation is what we termed the oligarchic theory as put forward by Bourgignon and Verdier (2000) and institutionalist perspective as represented by North, Wallis, Webb & Weingast (2007). Bourgignon and Verdier emphasised the role of the political elite who having captured political power which gives them right over the distribution of national income and political structure turn predatory and simply oppose investment in human capital development among the masses. The growth in the economy is appropriated by a very small percentage of the population mostly the political and business elite (the oligarchs). This situation always leads to a high level of inequality among the citizens. In Nigeria, according to Nigeria Deposit and Insurance Corporation (NDIC) among 70 million bank account holders in the country, only 2% own 90% of total bank deposits as at June 2016. This clearly illustrates the level of inequality that exists in the country, 2% own 90% while 98% share 10% among themselves.

The Oligarchs are the sole reason why the nation's corruption perception index (CPI) and Human development index (HDI) are indifferent to change in political system. Even though there was a change in political system but there was no real change in political class. Out of four presidents that Nigeria have had since the inception of the current democratic dispensation two are retired generals, while one was a younger brother of a retired general. The old Oligarchs are still in power and the status quo remains.

They have succeeded in establishing what North, Wallis, Webb & Weingast (2007) termed limited access order. The Oligarchs having captured political power limits outsiders' access to valuable resources in the polity like land, capital, trade and education. This gives them (the oligarchs) an exclusive right to the polity's resources that generate rent. With economic and political power exclusively in their hand they maintained order and stability in the polity. This resultant order is limited access order. All institutions within the polity limits access to

economic and political power to non-elites, this explains why poverty, unemployment, squalor and death is increasing amidst economic growth. The masses have been shut out.

Development will never be achieved so long as access to states' resources are limited and the dividends of economic growth are corruptly appropriated by a tiny portion of the population. As emphasised by North development will only come about through moving from limited access order to open access order by altering the institutional frameworks, the main elements which are the state and the elites.

The study recommends review of Nigeria's political process to guarantee limitless access to all citizens, irrespective of social class. This will usher in mass political participation and accountability demanding populace. A corollary to this is to deemphasize the monetization of the political system and process, thereby, purging the polity of elitism. Secondly, systemic corruption which has become so cancerous to every facet of Nigeria's economic, political social and even religious lives should be genuinely fought and degraded massively. Lastly, a sustained investment in human capital is a prerequisite for Nigeria to attain development. Domestic technological capabilities, educational investments, especially, science and technology, as well as investment in public healthcare facilities, should signpost Nigeria's readiness to transmute improvements in national income into development.

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